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This paper presents a novel theoretical view on impulsive action, integrating thus far
separate perspectives on non-reﬂective action, motivation, emotion regulation, and
impulse control. We frame impulsive action in terms of directedness of the individual
organism toward, away, or against other givens – toward future states and away from
one’s present state. First, appraisal of a perceived or thought-of event or object on occasion,
rapidly andwithout premonition or conscious deliberation, triggers amotive tomodify one’s
relation to that event or object. Situational speciﬁcs of the event as perceived and appraised
motivate and guide selection of readiness for a particular kind of purposive action. Second,
perception of complex situations can give rise to multiple appraisals, multiple motives,
and multiple simultaneous changes in action readiness. Multiple states of action readiness
may interact in generating action, by reinforcing or attenuating each other, thereby yielding
impulse control. We show how emotion control can itself result from a motive state or
state of action readiness. Our view links impulsive action mechanistically to states of
action readiness, which is the central feature of what distinguishes one kind of emotion
from another. It thus provides a novel theoretical perspective to the somewhat fragmented
literature on impulsive action.
Keywords: action readiness, appraisal, control precedence, emotional impulses, impulse control, multiple
emotions, impulsive action, motivation
IMPULSIVE ACTIONS
The notion of impulsive action is often used but rarely speciﬁed.
It refers to an action that is elicited by the appraisal of a per-
ceived or thought-of object, event, or state of the world as pleasant
or unpleasant, or as beneﬁcial or harmful, and which action is
apt to inﬂuence that object, event, or state of the world. The
appraisal ﬁrst gives rise to a state of readiness to establish, modify,
sustain, or terminate the agent’s relation to the object, event, or
state of the world concerned. That readiness then may induce
an action that can implement the readiness’ aim. Actions are
considered “impulsive” when and because they are not preceded
by deliberation or the conscious representation of some action
goal.
An impulsive action is thus deﬁned as a non-deliberate action
that serves the purpose of rendering one’s relation to the object,
event, or state of the world more pleasant or less unpleasant. This
deﬁnition answers the problem how an action can be purposive
without being planned or premeditated. It is the appraisal that
imparts the purpose by giving rise to a state of action readiness
to change one’s relation to its object. It enhances interaction with
what is appraised as beneﬁcial or attracting. It decreases inter-
action with what is appraised as aversive or harmful, under the
current situational conditions. How appraisal may impart pur-
pose and elicit action readiness will be discussed in later sections
on action readiness elicitation and on the neural bases of impulsive
action.
Impulsive actions not only have a purpose or aim. They also
have a certain strength or urgency. They generally possess some
“impetus”– an inclination todo something. They owe that strength
or urgency to being set for the forthcoming action, and its continu-
ation until a particular end state has been reached, and resumption
of actions in spite of interruptions and obstacles. “Impulsion”
and “impetus” are terms dating from the middle ages and may
seem old-fashioned, but we have a need for a concept that allows
us to refer to the dynamic aspects of impulsive actions, and the
energetics required to produce them. These various aspects have
been caught under the designation of control precedence of ongo-
ing impulsive actions and strivings (Frijda, 1986, 2007). Control
precedence includes persistence of action over time until a par-
ticular end state has been reached, and resumption of actions
in spite of interruptions and obstacles. For instance, one may
continue making reproaches when one’s antagonist has already
apologized for an offense. The number of knife stabs in violent
marital ﬁghts is higher than in the average knife killing (Wolfgang,
1958). Impulsive actions entail selective attentional bias, overat-
tending to what ﬁts the impulsive action in course, and neglecting
other information (e.g., Wiers et al., 2010). Impulsive actions also
tend to be given precedence over other actions for which an elicitor
happens to be present, and which the subject tends to disregard.
These various dynamic features are intrinsic to the intent and
impact of the impulsive action. The summed magnitude of the
ratings of those dynamic properties over a past emotional inci-
dent correlates with ratings of how intense the emotion has been.
That felt intensity can be considered as having been caused by
the dynamic aspects of impulsive action (Sonnemans and Frijda,
1994).
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As elaborated in earlier work, action readiness and changes in
action readiness form the key to what we call “emotions,” since
action readiness covers the variations in self-object relationships
(Frijda, 1986, 2007). From this perspective, all impulsive actions
qualify as emotional actions. However, not all emotional actions
are impulsive. Many such actions and signs of a change in readiness
for action aim at some premeditated goal and qualify as emo-
tional on the one hand, but as deliberate rather than impulsive
on the other. Moreover, many such deliberate emotional actions
show restraint and control of actions that moderate the effects and
magnitudes of impulsive actions.
THE AIMS OF THE PRESENT PAPER
The present paper aims to convey the following views which,
together, constitute a novel conjecture of impulsive action in
relation to emotion regulation.
• First, impulsive actions are produced by motives to alter the
current state of the world so as to approximate a more opti-
mal state. These motive states themselves can be understood as
states of action readiness (Frijda, 1986, 2007) that have a certain
strength and urgency (i.e., impulsion).
• Second, these states of action readiness are instigated by how a
perceived (or recalled or imagined) object or event is appraised
by the individual: the degree to which it is pleasant or unpleas-
ant, or expected tobeneﬁt orharm the agent. Given the elements
of appraisal and action readiness, impulsive action is emotional
action.
• Third, perceived, recalled, and imagined objects or events are
often appraised in several different ways by the same individ-
ual, thereby eliciting multiple states of action readiness. These
multiple states of action readiness may interact.
• Fourth: building on previous work (Mesquita and Frijda, 2011),
such interaction may contribute to regulation of impulsive
action, and hence to emotion regulation.
STATES OF ACTION READINESS
Agents that are not acting still can be in a state of readiness for
acting in a particular kind. They can be in “states of being set
for presenting various patterns of behavior when the appropri-
ate stimulus conditions in the external environment are available”
(Morgan, 1943, p. 461; Gallistel, 1980, p. 321). The term action
readiness was borrowed from Dewey (1895). Its analysis empha-
sizes that motive states are not representations of desirable states,
but actual preparations for action, including the adoption of an
attitude toward an object or event, from which an actual change
of relationship with that object or event may emerge (Bull, 1951;
Deonna and Teroni, 2012).
More precisely: states of action readiness presumably consist of
subthreshold preparatory potentiations for establishing, enhanc-
ing, modifying, or maintaining some self-object relationship as
well as potentiations of relevant coping skills. The self-object rela-
tionships that action readiness is concerned with manifest many
different modes. Different modes of action readiness have dif-
ferent aims. One can be motivated to be and remain close to
someone else; or to be hostile to someone; or to avoid some
object or situation, or to relish in interacting with something
delightful; or to entertain no relationshipwith anyobjectwhatever.
Approaching and avoiding, attending, adopting a hostile stance,
afﬁliation, dominance, submission, and effecting gratuitous inter-
actions, as in joyful exuberance, are examples of such different
motive states (Frijda, 2007). Certain modes of action readiness in
fact correspond to certain common emotion names: hostility to
anger, avoidance to fear, and submission to awe (Frijda and Par-
rott, 2011). “States of action readiness” include states of absence
or disinclination for action. Along these lines we can say that a
disinclination to act corresponds to apathy (Frijda and Parrott,
2011).
In any one given encounter with a particular object or situation
in a particular mode of action readiness, a person can avail him-
or herself of a number of different actions that have an equivalent
effect (Frijda, 1986). When angry one can kick, shout insults, turn
one’s back. These all are able to hurt or intimidate one’s oppo-
nent. When charmed by some person, one can kiss, offer ﬂowers,
or say endeared words: these all may result in drawing or keep-
ing the charming person nearby. When running away in fear, one
seeks to increase the distance to the danger source, but one may
also hide behind a protective barrier, or throw an obstacle in front
of the approaching threat. Selecting a particular action can only
proceed when, consciously or unconsciously, a motive is estab-
lished: the action should accomplish a particular modiﬁcation in
a particular self-object relationship, such as the riddance of an
itch. Inversely, assuming an action to have a motive is an inference
from observing a variety of equifunctional actions in a self-object
interaction. A motive itself can be conceived of as being set to
expect a particular input, along the lines proposed in predictive
coding theory (Von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950; Friston, 2012;
Clark, 2013).
Each state of action readiness can become manifest in various
ways. They may show themselves in a variety of impulsive actions
that share their aims. Action, and attention for the event and
how it develops, tend to manifest features such as persistence and
action power – features of control precedence. Actions implement
relational motives that indeed modify the self-object relationship.
But an aim may also appear in a mere fragment of action, a frown
for instance, which can be understood as a fraction of an action
of assembling effort; a slight backward tilt of the head betrays
an attitude of keeping distance from the interaction partner. A
state of action readiness may also be only felt by the agent, as a
non-overt inclination, or experienced as a mental image of action
(Ridderinkhof and Brass, submitted for publication). It ﬁnally
may be evident only to the subject him- or herself in a covert
cognitive action, such as thoughts of actions and of action-relevant
objects. As such they may be felt and verbally identiﬁed. They
may cause recurrence of the motives and urges in thought, as in
thinking again and again of the person one fell in love with – even
while tying one’s shoe-laces, or in noticing that one’s walks led
by her or his house. They may lead to planning and execution of
deliberate action at a later time, even when control precedence has
decayed.
States of action readiness presumably consist of subthresh-
old potentiations of relevant coping skills, such as attentional
orientations to target objects, setting of efference copies or of
collateral discharges, perceptual expectancies, changes in motor
cortex excitability (van Loon et al., 2010), and bodily preparations.
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The preparations may remain limited to mere potentiations of the
neural networkunderlying the coping skills concerned, as yetwith-
out motor engagement. Action readiness may in such instances
remain limited to readiness that is merely felt and not observ-
able in overt behavior. Reports of feelings of different emotional
urges (e.g., Davitz, 1964) indeed provide a major argument for the
motive state or action readiness hypothesis.
ACTION READINESS ELICITATION: EVENT APPRAISAL
What elicits action readiness? And what keeps it going? Emotions
are aroused by events: events as directly perceived, or as described
in a book or newspaper, or as observed on television or internet, or
as related by a third person, or as recollected, or otherwise appear-
ing in the mind, for instance in the form of thoughts. Motives and
their states of action readiness (including autonomic responses)
are elicited by events as these are appraised in a fraction of a second
(Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 2007). Appraisal refers to the information
that confers personal meaning to brute perceived events, which is
drawn from environmental stimuli plus their temporal and spa-
tial context, plus that drawn from actually interacting with the
event, and that which is drawn from stored, associated informa-
tion. The information can be of two kinds. It can pertain to what
the event may do or offer to the individual (e.g., hurt him or her,
carry satisfactions or signal likely coming satisfactions, deprive
him or her from satisfactions). And it can pertain to “affordances”
(Gibson, 1979): the action possibilities provided to us by the envi-
ronment. This kind of information relates to event aspects that
suggest possibilities for action that the event affords or does not
allow.
Major appraisals result from interactions between event prop-
erties on the one hand and sensitivities of the individual on the
other. They are often considered in terms of appraisal dimen-
sions (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 2005). One such
dimension of appraisal is the valence of an event: its intrinsic pleas-
antness or unpleasantness. Another is the individual’s appraisal of
his or her ability to cope or deal with an event or its impacts,
and the magnitude of the event’s impacts. Another again is the
attribution of the event to some other person, to oneself, or to
fate.
The most central appraisal is whether an event is appraised to
promote or obstruct one or more of the person’s goals, needs,
values, or more generally concerns (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003;
Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 2007). Concerns relate to what an individ-
ual cares about. Appraised concern pertinence is the condition
for an event to operate as an emotional event. It provides the
major basis for hedonic value: for pleasantness, unpleasantness,
and desirability. In the absence of concern pertinence, there is no
motive, no motive state, no change in action readiness; in short,
no emotion. Concerns include everything that affects the pres-
ence, availability, or intactness of that which an individual cares
about (cf. Frankfurt, 1988). They include conditions that are vital
to survival, to attachments, but also values that the individual
subscribes to, such as concerns for knowing the truth, for self-
esteem, for being part of a social group, for well-being of others,
for ﬁnding meaning in life, – concerns of which the motivating
power may considerably vary from one culture to another (e.g.,
Schwartz, 1995).
An important kind of action readiness has as its aim to ter-
minate or attenuate prepared or ongoing action. That kind of
action readiness leads to actions that control or inhibit prepared
or ongoing impulsive action. Control or inhibitory actions are trig-
gered by the appraisal of expected as well as unexpected undesired
consequences of one’s ongoing actions.
Appraisal processes largely proceed automatically and non-
consciously (Lambie and Marcel, 2002). They can do so because
received information, or information entering from mem-
ory can evoke a cloud of associations (Friston, 2012; Frijda,
2013). Yet, they are interspersed with conscious and deliberate
efforts at exploring and articulating the informational con-
tent, whenever the automatic processes fail to give adequate
guidance for further processing (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987).
Not all available appraisal- and affordance-relevant informa-
tion is processed. Scope and degree of attention are variable,
and information pick-up is inﬂuenced by interests and per-
ceptual habits. Control precedence of current action readiness,
for instance, may appreciably restrict that pick-up (Easter-
brook, 1959). In contrast, when affordances are relevant to
the moment’s action orientation and concern engagement, they
do inﬂuence the course of further processing (Rietveld, 2008,
2012).
Concern pertinence of an event, too, is largely appraised auto-
matically. One often is not aware of why one loves, hates, likes, or
dislikes (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002). Concern perti-
nence of an event is mainly manifest after the facts of appraised
event valence, emergence of action readiness, control precedence,
and possibly subsequent impulsive action.
Appraisal – the entire pattern of values of the various appraisal
aspects – is what generates the person’s state of action readi-
ness: whether or not something has to be done with or about
the self-object relationship, and if something has to be done,
what has to be done, and with which urgency and control
precedence.
But not only that. It also provides the motive for that state of
readiness, and hence motivation for action. Appraisal identiﬁes
what relationship should be established or modiﬁed. One views
an attractive person at the other side of the fence: the attractiveness
primes aims for interaction andproximity, and the fence represents
an obstacle that has to be dealt with, with a particular kind of
action.
THE AIMS OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS
Impulsive action is situation- or event-elicited. That is: it is trig-
gered by how the object or event is appraised. It is released by
what the event or object suggests it may offer or may do to the
agent, or may withhold from him or her. One is right in front of
the relevant information for guiding one’s actions. Notice that no
explicit goal representation is needed for such guidance. One faces
an object or event that one is appraising. It is before one’s eyes or
before one’s mind’s eye, and it remains there until one has ﬁnished
acting. The action is guided by what Searle (1983) calls intention
in action, and Dreyfus (2005) and Pacherie (2000, 2001) call motor
intention. One can also just refer to it as an intent, evoked by what
the object or event appears to promise or spell, in the way that
relevant affordances do.
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Crucially, adequacy and efﬁcacy of impulsive actions scale with
the availability of relevant skills or expertise. To the skilled bad-
minton opponent, appraisal of even a well-concealed, crossed
drop-shot may generate a relevant affordance for adequate non-
reﬂective reaction which – without premeditation or further
deliberation – renders a speciﬁc motive state, a readiness to act,
an adequate action impulse. In contrast, a lack of relevant affor-
dances may leave the novice stand “frozen” – that is, without an
intent, without a concrete motive for action, without any action
impulse.
Thus, an action is retrieved fromone’s action repertoire that can
implement the current motive; or one is constructed on the spot,
primed by some affordance presented by the object or event.When
hostile, seeing a gun lying around facilitates gun-using imagery
(Berkowitz, 1974).Whenhostile and seeing a bicycle stand around,
one may use that bicycle as a projectile and throw it at a police van
during a street row. Retrieval from one’s action repertoire and
ad hoc construction or improvised performance are motivated by
current affect: by directed discontent (Rietveld, 2008). Adequate
actions reduce directed discontent, by meeting the current motive
of action readiness.
When encountering an event with emotional impact, plausi-
ble actions are retrieved from one’s action repertoire, with what
the action should do – the motive – as the selection criterion.
Every adult has a huge repertoire of relational action skills, both
pragmatic and social one’s (Rietveld, 2012). Many of those skills
have innate bases in body structure – clawing, biting, crawling,
and grasping are prime examples in humans and other animals –
that develop into true skills by pragmatic activities and play (e.g.,
Campos et al., 1996), that in turn form sources for perceiving
affordances (Rietveld, 2012), and that can be adapted to other
contexts than those in which they developed. One can bite to
eat and one can bite to harm to implement a hostile action
tendency.
The pragmatic and social actions alluded to are basic ones.
They may require little information processing, and still often
be effective. Approach, for instance, is an easy action that helps
in implementing desire as well as intimacy. So-called emotional
expressions are among those basic actions; they probably are
prewired. Crying may well be viewed as an alarm call that often
works in providing help upon an event that lead to the action
readiness null-state of helplessness (Frijda andParrott, 2011). Such
basic expressions are informationally and computationally cheap,
and thus afforded as non-reﬂective actions.
ENGAGEMENT
Elicitation of action readiness requires a general condition in
addition to appraisal: engagement. “Strength of engagement can
contribute to experienced value through its contribution to the
experience of motivational force – an experience of the intensity of
the force of attraction to or repulsion from the value target” (Hig-
gins, 2006, p. 439). It amounts to the capacity for interest, which
enables information uptake and processing leading to appraisal
taking place at all.
Specifying the nature of the condition of engagement depends
on the theoretical interpretation of what that capacity of engage-
ment or being interested consists of. It canbe viewed as the capacity
to energize motive states and subsequent action (Robbins and
Everitt, 2007), and to invest perceived objects or events with incen-
tive value, the power to want them (Berridge, 2007), or to learn
that given stimuli predict that rewards or punishments will follow
(Schultz, 2007).
All three – not very dissimilar – options are interpretations
of the operation of neurotransmitters such as the midbrain
dopamine system or, probably, of the dopamine/serotonin bal-
ance (Lewis, 2011). Drastic reduction of midbrain dopamine
(in for instance Parkinson’s disease) renders the patient passive
and unresponsive, and peaks in dopamine by contrast reﬂect
enhanced motivation (e.g., Cools et al., 2010; Aarts et al., 2012)
or craving (Lewis, 2011). Other neurotransmitters (serotonin,
oxytocin, norepinephrine) appear to fulﬁll similar functions in
regulating motivation in different motivational domains, such
as those of withdrawal, contentment, afﬁliation, neural toning
down, and curiosity (e.g., Tops et al., 2009; Cools et al., 2010;
Jepma et al., 2010; Veening et al., 2010; Lewis, 2011; Murphy et al.,
2011).
Near-total disappearance of action readiness can also occur
because of more psychological conditions. We remarked above
that there is no action readiness in the absence of concern per-
tinence. Concerns include everything that affects the presence,
availability, or intactness of that which an individual cares about
(cf. Frankfurt, 1988). On occasion, events may be appraised as
unbearable, as urgently demanding change, but that no spe-
ciﬁc aim for producing change appears available. No meaningful
action comes to mind, except “this has to end, in any possi-
ble way.” It would seem to be the background of urges toward
suicide, or to sense of total incompetence or uncontrollability,
which in our view is the background and structure of true anxi-
ety (McReynolds, 1976). It occurs under torture and under threat
of betraying comrades under torture (Lanzmann, 2009). Simi-
lar conditions would appear to be capable of inducing mental
dissociation, or sense of estrangement and apathy (cf. Hilgard,
1977).
PERCEIVED EVENTS MAY INDUCE MULTIPLE APPRAISALS
The preceding sections viewed appraisal as arousing action readi-
ness, and action readiness as arousing some impulsive action,
jointly with speciﬁc attributes of the event (as for instance its dis-
tance from the agent, the presence of shelter). However, emotional
events are rarely simple. Encountered objects or events often can
be appraised by a given individual in several ways at the same time.
They thereby may generate several different states of action readi-
ness, which may interfere or interact. The smell of roasted lamb
chop may awaken desire, while simultaneously the thought of the
poor killed lamb may elicit aversion. Appraisal of objects or events
thus can give rise to multiple simultaneous changes of states of
action readiness.
Multiplicity of emotion frequently occurs, sincemost situations
present a multiplicity of affordances, and touch upon a multiplic-
ity of concerns. Oatley and Duncan (1992), without extensive
probing, found 31% of diary-reported emotions to be multiple
emotion instances.
There is in fact nothing mysterious about several motive states
being manifest simultaneously. They may show in the complexity
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of expressive behavior, as when a person looks at someone, but is
not facing him or her in full; or as when meeting someone and
mingling evidence of affection (a smile, say), invitation (open-
ing the eyes more widely), and abandoning oneself, by adding
a more erect stance. Such blends appear to closely mirror the
momentary shades of readiness for further interaction. Similar
sorts of blends appear when someone is tense, shows a deﬁant
glance and clenches his or her ﬁsts, but also leans backwards
in disengaging from direct personal interaction. Such motive
state interpretations of expressive behavior can be experimen-
tally validated. In several studies, subjects had to score expression
pictures in terms of action tendencies, in which they obtained
action readiness ratings that were about as consistent among
raters as were their emotion label assignments (Tcherkassof et al.,
2007).
In addition, emotion-inducing events frequently carrymultiple
meanings. They instigate several different appraisals. The death of
a close loved one implies a loss but may also entail relief from care
and worry. The two facts are appraised as sad and as not unpleas-
ant, respectively. They may well incite different states of action
readiness, such as respectively passivity and renewed openness for
the world.
One and the same event thus may allow different appraisals
to emerge almost simultaneously, even for the same individual.
That constellation is common. Being treated unkindly by one’s
spouse evokes one’s anger. But one may realize that one’s very
emerging anger also may hurt one’s cherished spouse, with whom
one is inclined to interact with consideration, if only for not
spoiling one’s evening together. In fact, every novel element in
perceiving an object or event is appraised. As long as one is atten-
tive, one appraises what the event suggests it might offer, what
it might require to cope with what the object might do to the
agent, or to as yet obtain what it might refuse or yield. And all
that appears to be within reach, since the agent is looking at the
situation. And each newly perceived element may modify the cur-
rent action readiness. When you see a child falling into the water,
you appraise that event as urgently needing intervention, and you
may impulsively jump after it, unless something new occurs that
cuts one’s jumping short. Or the efforts spent in the impulsive
action terminate the engagement, and action readiness gets into a
lull.
MULTIPLE EMOTIONS MAY INTERACT
Simultaneous motive states can be expected to interact. They in
fact have to interact, since they have to share output channels:
action provisions, attention resources, logistic support resources,
and so forth. The interactions are required for coordinating the
multiple emotions’ calls for action. Such coordinations lead to
motive states, actions, and feelings that differ from those that
would have become manifest when each emerged in isolation.
Together, they result in mixed emotions or mixed feelings (Schim-
mack, 2001). For instance, affect is weakened or troubled when
pleasure and pain occur simultaneously. Sense of ambivalence
and vacillation appear, as extensively shown by Cacioppo et al.
(2004), when unipolar rather than bipolar measures of affect were
used (e.g., Wiers et al., 2005). True mixed feelings are observed
in nostalgia, consisting of pain moderated by the happiness that
was, together with pleasure moderated by the regret that it had
gone (Bellelli and Saldarelli, 1990). Enhancement of pleasure
and desire can be expected to occur when two sources of plea-
sure or desire happen to coincide: he or she is both bright and
beautiful.
But what happens when multiple kinds of action readiness
interaction depend upon their relative strengths. Net inclina-
tion and the power of action may become attenuated. It does,
for instance, in approach/avoidance conﬂict such as examined by
Miller (1959), where the animal stands still halfway. Or compro-
mise or synthesizing action may be elicited when it is available
in the individual’s repertoire, by having been acquired by social-
ization, with sharing as a solution of possession conﬂicts as an
example (Campos et al., 2004; Mesquita and Albert, 2007). Or
one mode of action readiness (e.g., withdrawal, by anticipation of
shock) may override the other action readiness (e.g., approach to
one’s infants; Richter, 1927), or sexual desire being overridden by
approach of a powerful rival (DeWaal, 1982), or by an overbearing
or insensitive partner.
MULTIPLE EMOTIONS CAN EXERT CONTROL
The interaction of multiple states of action readiness is illustrated
in regulation of action, instigated by the concurrent appraisal of
the expected consequences of one’s own impulsive actions (Gray
and McNaughton, 2000). Anger is often held back by fear of retal-
iation or loss of affection. Fear of danger can be kept in check
impulsively by shame or fear to appear sissy to others. Desire
for drink or drugs may be tamed by the foresight of a hang-
over, of one’s upcoming loss of self-esteem, or one’s behavioral
inefﬁciency.
The interaction of multiple modes of action readiness is one
of the mechanisms of impulse regulation. One does not want
to hurt one’s spouse, even if he or she just hurt you. Although
very much liking to drink, one also does not want to become a
useless or despised drunk. One wants to escape from the pains
of abstention of smoking or drinking, – those stinging, breath-
cutting urges that may feel like dying if not satisﬁed at once (Baker
et al., 2004).
This implies that processes that regulate action are at least to
some extent impulsive. These processes may not have regulation
as their goal, but make way for concurrent or competing action
readiness. One state of action readiness may happen to weaken or
modify another one, such as action readiness for tender interaction
on occasion happening to attenuate hostile approach, depending
upon which of the two promises more beneﬁt. We may suspect
that in such constellations the emotion-regulating action readi-
ness captures the action system non-reﬂectively and calls on action
inhibition and override systems, relying on the same action con-
trol networks in the brain as engaged by other types of impulsive
action (reviewed in the section on the neural bases of impulsive
action).
Interaction between simultaneous motive states can also avail
itself of a number of general purpose actions that presumably
do not operate in goal-directed fashion, such as hesitation and
postponing, preferring to fully or only partly engaging attention,
being more or being less receptive for available information, such
as responding to affordances.
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There are many more automatic interaction processes: such as
automatic inhibition as generated by anxiety elicited by unwanted
impulses (Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Rothbart and Sheese,
2007) and by unwanted information, leading to shrinking back
from exploration of threatening cognitive contents (Derakshan
et al., 2007); and those that implement the range and degree of
attention (Posner and Rothbart, 2007), from hypervigilance to
deﬂecting attention, and the self-organization in the fusing of
action tendencies, and in the feedback processes that contribute
to action by ensuring coordination between activations (Lewis,
2005; Lewis and Todd, 2007). Thompson et al. (2008) detailed
a number of such mechanisms, of different levels of complexity
and informational involvement, down to vagal control (Porges,
2007).
EMOTION REGULATION AND IMPULSE CONTROL
Action and impulse regulation are in fact largely driven by affec-
tively steered states of action readiness. They to a large extent result
from affective appraisals of action options, and the following of
action-outcome preferences. Some impulses are best held in check
until more appropriate times: when holding a cup of hot coffee, an
itch may well trigger a scratching impulse, but one would do better
to put the cup on a nearby table before giving in to the urge. In
soccer, a jinx-movement by one’s direct opponent will manage to
capture an impulsive reaction unless one can hold one’s horses and
keep one’s eyes on the ball. The bases for such regulatory effects can
be phrased more precisely. Emotions are moderated or controlled
to the extent that one emotionally cares about the affective conse-
quences of their being uncontrolled. Caring here means: grasped
as contributing to concern satisfaction, or as avoiding to violate
concerns. They are controlled, for instance, when one considers
it worthwhile to behave in socially agreeable fashion, or when an
addict considers it worthwhile to suffer the pains and efforts of
abstention. One may consider it worth to suffer prolonged torture
for not betraying a comrade, and even to commit suicide to pre-
vent betraying. These are forms of regulation that Kuhl and Koole
(2004) distinguish from simple self-control under the heading of
self-maintenance. Satisfying the concerns involved in not betraying
a comrade or in accepting to stop taking drugs or drinks evidently
makes it worth to pay the costs: satisfying the concerns involved
evidently outweighs the suffering of pains. The concerns satisﬁed
by not betraying the comrade and by stopping drugs and drinks
are concerns one accepts – that is, that one accepts to be concerned
about.
That implies that such regulation also expands the range of
acceptable action options, such as endeavoring to endure torture,
or to accept the sufferings of abstention. It renders even seriously
dealing with a serious temptation or addiction a matter of choice,
as long as some energy for coping remains. Abandoning to tempta-
tions and abandoning self-maintenance are not always inevitable
(Frijda, 2010; Lewis, 2011).
NEURAL BASES OF IMPULSIVE ACTION
The outcome of appraisal directs one toward action that helps
to optimize one’s relation to the world. But how does impulsive
action become purposive? What are the neural mechanisms that
support purposive impulsive action?
In order for anticipated action effects to be ﬁne-tuned vis-
à-vis what the action should accomplish, and hence allow for
purposiveness of the action, a pragmatic anticipation of an
action’s effect must entail the prediction of its sensory conse-
quences (Ridderinkhof, in press). Such pragmatics consists of
anticipations of exteroceptive and interoceptive sensation asso-
ciated with the action (including its direction, extent, strength,
and velocity, as well as the corresponding kinesthetic sensa-
tions; James, 1890). The pragmatic anticipation of some action
effect can serve to retrieve, deliberately or impulsively, the par-
ticular action that gives rise to the particular sensory effects
as associated with that action-effect (Herwig et al., 2007). The
pragmatic anticipation of an action can be elicited through non-
reﬂective priming by action affordances met and recognized along
the way.
At the neural level of analysis pragmatic anticipations are neu-
ral activation patterns generated on-the-ﬂy. Several brain circuits
contribute to these patterns. The pragmatic anticipation of an
action that serves to predict how the movement will unfold is
formed in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Desmurget et al.,
2009). Patients with apraxia resulting from damage to PPC have
difﬁculty in generating pantomime performance of what one
would stereotypically do with a hammer or comb (Clark et al.,
1994), even though they can perfectly mimic the act when it
is pantomimed by a model. The pragmatic anticipation of the
action’s effects is mapped from PPC onto premotor and motor
regions to activate the corresponding motor programs (Sirigu
et al., 1996; Snyder et al., 2000). The neural activation patterns
of pragmatic anticipation may in fact activate the descend-
ing motor pathways at subthreshold level (e.g., Jacobson, 1927;
Tanaka et al., 2008). The pragmatic anticipation of an action’s
effects thus awakens, at least incipiently, the actual movement
which is its object, often without one’s awareness (Münster-
berg, 1914). As we have proposed elsewhere (Ridderinkhof, in
press), this change in action readiness (or incipient motor cap-
ture), incited by a pragmatic anticipation, provides a basis for
forward models of anticipated sensory, kinematic, and muscu-
lar action effects, and may serve to prepare for effecting some
action that reduces the discrepancy between our current state
and the optimal state (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). The cerebellum
receives direct feedback from several sensory modalities, allowing
for the sensorimotor integration needed for on-the-ﬂy adjust-
ments as the action unfolds (Dietrich, 2008). The cerebellum has
been proposed to be a crucial component in the state estima-
tion process that combines information from motor efferent and
sensory afferent signals to produce a representation of the cur-
rent state of the motor system (Kawato, 1999; Miall et al., 2007).
Thus, together, these circuitries may constitute an important cir-
cuit for anticipating the sensory consequences of the movement
(Gerardin et al., 2000), and hence for rendering impulsive action
purposive.
Frontostriatal circuits in the brain, capitalizing on the infe-
rior frontal cortex, the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA),
and the basal ganglia, are engaged when impulsive actions
are to be interrupted, aborted, suppressed, or overridden by
more appropriate actions (Jahfari et al., 2011; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2011), even when such action control is triggered unconsciously
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(van Gaal et al., 2008). When multiple pragmatic anticipations
compete for bottom-up activation, the demands on action con-
trol are highest, and selecting the appropriate action engages
stronger activation of the pre-SMA compared to when such
bottom-up activation is absent. In these demanding situations of
action conﬂict, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex provides top-
down guidance to action-selection areas (Hester et al., 2007),
the pre-SMA engages response inhibition as an instrument of
action selection (Swann et al., 2012), the inferior frontal cor-
tex is recruited to aid in implementing response inhibition
(Jahfari et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2012), and the basal ganglia
keep all responses in check until further processing has con-
verged on an action decision, and the ﬁnal call is received
from upstream: from the pre-SMA and other prefrontal regions
(Jahfari et al., 2011). Indeed, impulse control deﬁciencies are
observed in Parkinson’s disease (Wylie et al., 2012) and other
clinical populations with problems in these frontostriatal circuits
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2012; De Haan et al., 2013; Rietveld et al.,
2013).
CONCLUSION
Let us conclude by summarizing what can be drawn from this
analysis.
First, impulsive actions are instigated by events that, by non-
reﬂective processes of appraisal that have assessed the event’s
relevance to the individual’s concerns, elicited some motive to
establish or modify a self-object relationship. The ensuing state of
action readiness drives and instigates impulsive action that might
contribute to attaining the improved relationship.
Second, action selectionwhen implementing themotive state in
responding to events results neither from deliberate goal-directed
action nor from overlearned habits, but from non-reﬂective action
priming by affordances met and recognized along the way. Such
priming elicits a pragmatic anticipation of the action’s effects,
which entails the prediction of its exteroceptive and interocep-
tive sensory consequences. This allows for the evaluation and
ﬁne-tuning of anticipated action effects vis-à-vis what the action
should accomplish, which renders the impulsive action purposive.
Through efference copies or forward modeling, the pragmatic
anticipation leads to a state of action readiness. As a result,
impulsive action is by deﬁnition emotional.
Third, the perspective taken here denies the exclusivity of emo-
tion regulation processes. There is no clear distinction between
processes of emotion and processes of emotion regulation. In
large measure, emotion regulation also proceeds impulsively:
effortless, by the interaction of concurrent impulsive, emotional
processes.
Fourth, viewing emotion regulation and impulse control at
least in part as outcomes of the interaction of multiple states of
action readiness is an alternative to viewing them as the outcomes
of shifts of the operation of an “impulsive” processing system to
a “reﬂective” processing system, in a dual processing fashion, as
this was viewed by Strack and Deutsch (2004). They should not,
in general, be seen as the outcomes of reason controlling emotion,
or the rider controlling the horse. Quite on the contrary, our
perspective accords with Hume (1739), in viewing reason as the
slave of the passions. Reﬂective and deliberate processes seek to
help solving impulsive dilemmas that impulsive processes alone
are unable to solve.
Fifth, impulse control and emotion regulation can be expected
to be served by enhancing relevant multiple emotions by focusing
on non-obvious but relevant concerns, such as moral concerns
and self-esteem.
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